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Case Digest

The purpose of the Case Digest is to identify and summarize for the reader
those cases that have less significance than those which merit an in-depth analysis.
Included in the digest are cases that apply established legal principles without
necessarily introducing new ones.
This initial digest includes cases reported from January through September,
1971. Henceforth, the Winter issue will include cases reported from April through
September, and the Spring issue will contain cases reported from October through
March. The cases are grouped into topical categories, and references are given for
further research. It is hoped that attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find
that this digest facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational
law.
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1.
HICKENLOOPER

ACT OF STATE

AMENDMENT

NOT AN

EXPANSION

OF "BERNSTEIN

ExCEPTION"

Plaintiff, a Cuban bank, brought suit in federal district court to
recover the excess realized on the sale of collateral securing a
renegotiated loan made by defendant, a United States bank. After the
renegotiation, the Cuban Government nationalized defendant's Cuban
banks. In retaliation, defendant sold the collateral and retained the
proceeds. The district court ruled that Banco Nacional de Cuba v.

Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), was restricted severely by the
Hickenlooper Amendment and that the Amendment was applicable to
the instant case. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
Amendment was not applicable in this case. While the case was on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Legal Adviser to the Department of
State wrote a letter to the Court explaining that the act of state
doctrine need not be applied in this case. Consequently, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision of the Second Circuit,
and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand,
defendant contended that the Second Circuit should change its prior
decision since the executive branch's submission of a "Bernstein
letter" had eliminated the rationale for applying the act of state
doctrine. The Second Circuit adhered to its prior decision, holding
that the exception to the act of state doctrine created by the
Bernstein case should be limited to its own facts, and, therefore, that
the State Department's letter did not remove the restraint on the
application of the doctrine. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. FirstNational
City Bank, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).

2.
SECTION

301

ADMIRALTY

OF LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT NOT A BAR TO

SEAMAN'S APPEAL TO FEDERAL COURTS

In lieu of seeking relief through the grievance procedure of a
collective bargaining agreement with his employer, plaintiff seaman
brought this suit in federal district court for wages under 46 U.S.C. §
596 (1970), claiming federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970), which grants exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the district
courts. The Supreme Court held that § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act does not preclude a seaman's suit for
wages under 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970). The Court reasoned that §
596 implies a right to appeal to the federal courts, the traditional
guardians of seamen's rights. Furthermore, the Court noted that the
Winter, 1971
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legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act did not
suggest that it was intended to supplant principles of admiralty. U.S.
Bulk Carriers,Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971).'

SHIP

NOT

RENDERED "UNSEAWORTHY"

DUE

TO PERSONAL

NEGLI-

GENCE

Petitioner, a longshoreman, was injured while loading cargo aboard
respondent's ship. The undisputed facts showed that the injury was
caused by the winch operator's negligence. The Supreme Court

affirmed a summary judgment for respondent, holding that petitioner
could not maintain a claim that the ship was unseaworthy when it was
undisputed that an individual's negligence caused the injury. Usner v.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971).2
FOREIGN CORPORATION SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS UNDER RULE

37

OF

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Three Greek seamen brough suit for personal injuries, wages,
maintenance and repatriation under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970), the general maritime law of the United States, and Liberian
law. The alleged events giving rise to the seamen's claims occurred in
foreign waters aboard the Caledonia. This vessel was owned by a
Panamanian corporation but operated by an English corporation with
an agent in the United States. The seamen claimed that the ship was in
fact owned, operated and controlled by American interests. The
Panamanian corporation in its answers to interrogatories stated that its
ownership was evidenced by bearer stock. Neither the English
corporation nor its American agent replied to the interrogatories. The
district court granted the shipowner's motion to refuse jurisdiction
over the action. On appeal, the court ruled that the judgment of the
district court should be vacated and the action remanded for
completion of the discovery on the issue of jurisdiction. To aid in
disclosure of all pertinent facts, the court stated that sanctions under
rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied.
The court stated further that if justice required, the district court
should enter a default judgment on the issue of liability. Lekkas v.
Liberian M/V Caledonia,443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971).
1. See Significant Developments, 51 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1971).
2. For an in-depth comment on this case, see George, Ship's Liability to
Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness-SierackiThrough Usner, 3 J. MARI-

TIME L. 45 (1971). See also Comment, 50 ORE. L. REV. 197 (1971); Current

Developments, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 137 (1971).
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IN
FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL
LIMITATIONS
CONTROL THOSE IN CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT
TIME

PROCEDURE

Steel pipe was shipped aboard the S.S. Egle under defendant's bill
of lading. Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court within one year
from the date of delivery and alleged that the cargo had been
damaged. Approximately eighteen months later, defendant filed a
third party complaint against the stevedore company that had handled
the pipe during the unloading. The third party defendant moved for
summary judgment, claiming that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1970), established a limitation of one
year. This limitation would bar the action by defendant against the

third party since the claim against the third party was filed more than
one year after the date of the cargo loss. The instant court noted that
the COGSA limitation conflicted with the impleading provisions of
rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After examining the
history of rule 14, the court found that the one year limitation in
COGSA was not controlling and that rules 14(a) and 14(b) should
apply with equal force in all federal court cases. Consequently, the
court held that a third party complaint might be filed by leave of
court at any time in an action under COGSA. Marubeni-Iida
(America), Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 327 F. Supp. 519
(S.D. Tex. 1971).

FAILURE TO PAY WAGES TO FOREIGN SEAMAN

IN AMERICAN PORT

MAY CONFER JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN SHIPOWNER

Plaintiff, a merchant seaman of Greek nationality, was injured
aboard his ship when it was outside the port of Aruba, Dutch West
Indies. The Panamanian-owned ship then proceeded to Portsmouth,
Virginia, where plaintiff was taken to a hospital. The ship's cargo was
unloaded, and the ship departed the day after plaintiff was taken
ashore. Plaintiff was repatriated to Greece within a month following
his hospitalization. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court to
recover damages for personal injury, wages and maintenance from the
vessel and her owner. The district court quashed service of process
obtained pursuant to a Virginia statute authorizing service upon the
State Corporation Commission as statutory agent for foreign corporations doing business in Virginia. On appeal, the instant court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case, stating that plaintiff's claim that
he had not been paid full wages due and owing when he was removed
from the ship might offer a basis for in personam jurisdiction. The
court concluded that the jurisdiction of the lower court would depend
Winter, 1971
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upon whether the plaintiff had in fact asserted a good faith claim for
unpaid wages. Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th
Cir. 1971).

STATE

DIRECT ACTION STATUTE EXTENDS
NATIONAL WATERS AT TIME OF INJURY

TO VESSEL

IN

INTER-

Plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, was injured while working aboard
his employer's vessel in international waters. The employee sued both
the employer and the employer's insurer. The claim against the

insurance carrier was based on a Louisiana direct action statute. The
insurer moved for summary judgment, alleging that the Louisiana
statute could not be applied in a maritime suit in which a Louisiana
based vessel was in international waters at the time of the injury. The
court held that the federal interest in maintaining a uniform maritime
law did not preclude application of the state's direct action procedure.
The court reasoned that no greater lack of uniformity would result
and that the state clearly had an interest in allowing a direct action
when both the tortfeasor and the insurer did business within the state.
Sassoni v. Savoie, 327 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1971).

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVED WHEN STATE ACTS AS STEVEDORE

Plaintiff, a seaman employed aboard a tugboat, boarded a barge
that the tug was to tow from Mobile to New Orleans. Plaintiff fell
through a hatch negligently left open by the Alabama State Docks
Department during earlier unloading operations. The instant court
found that when the state acted as a stevedore, it entered into a
federally regulated sphere in which federal law was controlling.
Consequently, the court held that by engaging in such activities, the
state impliedly waived its claim of sovereign immunity. Rivet v. East
Point Marine Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Ala. 1971).

DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL
CHILDREN,
OR
PARENTS,

DISTRESS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE AND
ARE
AWARDABLE
UNDER
GENERAL

FEDERAL MARITIME LAW

A detailed comment on this case is found at page 245 supra. In re
Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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MARINE

INSURANCE

COVERAGE SUSPENDED

BY

UNSEAWORTHINESS

RESULTING FROM INADEQUATE CREW

Plaintiff, a shrimp boat owner, instituted an action against his
marine insurance carrier to recover compensation for damages
sustained when the boat was grounded on the Texas coast. The federal
district court awarded compensation to plaintiff. On appeal, the
insurer claimed that plaintiff breached his warranty of seaworthiness
by manning his vessel with only two men instead of the three men
normally required for shrimping operations. Consequently, the insurer
claimed that it should not be required to indemnify plaintiff. The
court found for the insurer, reasoning that an inadequate crew
produced an unseaworthy condition and that, consequently, coverage
under the marine policy was suspended. Aguirre v. Citizens Casualty
Co. of New York, 441 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1971).

ADMIRALTY EXTENSION

ACT INAPPLICABLE TO INJURIES SUSTAINED

ON DRYDOCKED BARGE

Defendant's damaged barge was delivered to a repair facility, taken
out of the water, and work was begun on the damaged vessel. The
barge, whose stern was approximately sixty-five feet inland, was
boarded by plaintiff, a repairman. Plaintiff, momentarily blinded by
an intense onshore light located in the repair yard, was injured when
he tripped and fell into the barge's hold. After having recovered in an
action under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970), plaintiff initiated this action against
defendant barge company. The barge company subsequently impleaded the repair facility, and claimed that it was the latter's negligence
and breach of duty of workmanlike performance that proximately
caused the injury. The district court held for plaintiff. On appeal, the
court vacated and remanded the case, finding the Admiralty Extension
Act to be inapplicable. The court reasoned that no part of the barge
extended over navigable water. Additionally, the court held that the
navigable waters test was inapplicable to the breach of warranty of
seaworthiness since the damages were sustained aboard a vessel that
was not on navigable water. Furthermore, the court found that no
warranty of seaworthiness was made under the status test because the
repairs could not have been performed in the ordinary course of

shipping. Delome v. Union Barge Line Co., 444 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1971).
Winter, 1971
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SHIPOWNER'S DUTY TO FURNISH SAFE WORKING PLACE NOT EXTENDED BEYOND SHIP

Decedent seaman's ship was anchored approximately one and
one-half miles off Manila Bay, the Philippines, when shore leave was
granted to crew members. The ship had no launch service, and the

only means for traversing the distance from ship to shore was by
outrigger canoe. While returning to the ship, the seaman's canoe
capsized and the seaman drowned. The decedent's widow brought a
wrongful death action, and alleged that defendant was negligent in not
providing safe ship-to-shore transportation. The court concluded that
no collective bargaining agreement expressly required the shipowners
to provide suitable transportation to and from shore. The court turned
next to the question of whether the defendant was negligent under the
Jones Act. The court, following a prior ruling of the Ninth Circuit,
denied recovery. It reasoned that the shipowner's duty to provide a
safe place to work did not extend beyond the ship. Miles v. States

Marine Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
FREIGHT CONTAINERS

CONVERTIBLE INTO ROLLING TRAILERS NOT

CONSIDERED ORIGINAL CONTAINERS

Plaintiff, an importer whose principal warehouse was located in
Detroit, received garments manufactured in Puerto Rico and shipped
by an independently owned common carrier to the United States. The
garments were packed in heavy-duty cases that were then packed into
large metal vans capable of being fitted with wheels and pulled by
tractor-trailer cabs to their final destination. The city of Detroit
claimed that the vans were the original packages, as enunciated in
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), and that when
the heavy-duty cases were unloaded at plaintiff's warehouse, the
property lost its essential character as an imported good. As a result,
the State Tax Commission allowed the city to assess the goods.
Plaintiff appealed. The court reversed and held that the convertible
vans were merely a technological innovation in shipping and that since
the heavy-duty cases remained the original packages, the property was
not so broken up as to lose the constitutional immunity from
property taxation. Michigan State Tax Comm'n v. Garment Corp. of
America, 32 Mich. App. 715, 189 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).

MOORED

FLOATING

DRYDOCK NOT VESSEL

WHILE

IN USE AS DRY-

DOCK

Plaintiff, a machinist employed by defendant, was injured while

removing cargo from a ship undergoing repairs on a floating dry dock
Vol. 5-No. 1
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in defendant's marine repair facility. Plaintiff had received all the
payments to which he was entitled under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970),
when he brought this action against the shipowner. Plaintiff claimed
that the ship and the floating dry dock were in fact "vessels," and
that, consequently, the owner had breached a warranty of seaworthiness. This court, in reversing the decision for plaintiff, applied earlier
decisions of the Fifth Circuit which held, as a matter of law, that a
floating drydock is not a vessel when moored and in use as a dry dock.
The court reasoned that since the vessel being repaired could not have
remained afloat if placed in the water, it was clearly out of navigation
and no warranty of seaworthiness could exist. Keller v. Dravo Corp.,
441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971).

OUTER

CONTINENTAL

SHELF

LANDS

ACT APPLICABLE TO STATIO-

NARY OFFSHORE DRILLING RIGS

Decedent was employed by defendant corporation on defendant's
stationary gas well platform located thirty miles off the Louisiana
coast. The decedent disappeared from the platform and was never
found. Decedent's widow, after receiving benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901
(1970), filed a wrongful death action in district court, and alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant and unseaworthiness of the
defendant's platform. In affirming the dismissal of the action, the
court found that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1331 (1970), required that federal law be applied to the exclusion of
general maritime law in matters relating to artificial island drilling rigs
on the seabed of the continental shelf. Consequently, the court held
that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, compensation for
the injuries sustained in the present case could be recovered only
under the Longshoremen's Act. Bertrand v. Forest Corp., 441 F.2d
809 (5th Cir. 1971).

3.

ALIENS

DECLARED INTENT TO BECOME CITIZEN SUFFICIENT FOR ADMISSION
OF RESIDENT ALIEN TO BAR MEMBERSHIP

Petitioner, a citizen of the Republic of China and resident alien of
the United States, sought admission to the practice of law in the state
of Washington. Petitioner filed a sworn -declaration of intent to
Winter, 1971

CASE DIGEST

become a citizen of the United States; he would become eligible in
January, 1972. Pending hearing of this matter, petitioner was
permitted to take the July, 1970, bar examination, which he passed.
Nevertheless, he was denied admission to the bar by the Board of
Governors of the State Bar Association solely on the basis of a
requirement that applicants be United States citizens. Petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, alleging that the
citizenship restrictions were in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, that bar admission requirements were in conflict
with federal immigration statutes, and that the state bar requirements
were in conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Following the
decision by the Board of Governors on petitioner's application, the
Admission to Practice Rules were amended in order to open bar
membership to otherwise qualified resident aliens who had declared
their intent and who were proceeding with due diligence to become
United States citizens. As a result, the only question in the instant
case was whether these amendments were ineffective because of state
statutes that required United States citizenship for admission to
practice. The court held that the statutes posed no bar to the amended

Admission to Practice Rules. It reasoned that the statutes were
repealed by implication by the State Bar Act of 1933, which
established an integrated bar. The court concluded that the recent
amendments were effective and that petitioner should be admitted to
the bar. In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wash. 2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).

ALIEN'S EXEMPTION FROM MILITARY SERVICE NOT PERMANENT BAR
TO CITIZENSHIP

Petitioner, a native of Denmark, agreed to relinquish his right to
become an American citizen in exchange for exemption from military
service, pursuant to § 4(a) of the Selective Service Act of 1948. After
repeal of that section, the Selective Service attempted to draft
petitioner but found him to be physically unfit. Petitioner then
decided to apply for American citizenship. The district court denied
his petition on the ground that he was barred permanently from
acquiring citizenship because he had been exempted from conscription. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed. While § 315 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
provides that any alien who has applied for exemption from military
service on the ground of alienage and ".... is or was relieved.., from
such training or service on such ground, shall be permanently ineligible
to become a citizen of the United States," the Court was persuaded by
the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Hoellger, 273 F.2d
Vol. 5-No. 1
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760 (2d Cir. 1960) and held that an alien who was first relieved from
service but later inducted was not barred from citizenship. The Court
reasoned that an alien was barred only during the period that the
Government exempted him from military service. Astrup v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 402 U.S. 509 (1971).

INTERVENING

RESIDENCE

PREVENTS

STATUS

AS

ALIEN

FLEEING

COMMUNIST COUNTRY

Petitioner fled from mainland China to Hong Kong and maintained
his residence and business there for six years. Petitioner later traveled
to the United States and overstayed his visitor's permit. Deportation
proceedings were commenced. Petitioner, in seeking an immigrant
visa, claimed a preference under the Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970), formerly ch. 477, § 203, 66
Stat. 178 (1952), on the grounds that he was an alien fleeing
persecution by a Communist country. The Supreme Court held that
the visa was properly denied by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The Court reasoned that in order to qualify under §
203(a)(7), an alien's presence in the United States must be a direct
consequence of his flight from persecution and that there can be no
intervening residence in a third country. Rosenburg v. Yee Chien Woo,
402 U.S. 49 (1971).

DEPORTEE

CANNOT

RE-ENTER

U.S.

ALTHOUGH

EARLIER

DEPORTA-

TION ORDER ILLEGAL

Defendant, an Italian citizen, was convicted in 1934 for possession
of narcotics. He was deported in 1956, but was discovered in the
United States in May, 1970. Defendant was charged with violating the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970), which
makes it unlawful for a deported alien to return to the United States.
Defendant argued that the deportation order was illegal and that
deportation 22 years after the narcotics offense violated the statute of
limitations. The court held that even if the earlier deportation order
was illegal, the deportee had no right to re-enter the United States as
long as the deportation order was in existence. Additionally, the court
relied on Arriaga-Ramirez v. United States, 325 F.2d 857 (10th Cir.
1963), and held that a deportation order could not be collaterally
attacked in a criminal prosecution conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326
(1970). United States v. Bruno, 328 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
Winter, 1971
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STATUTES

CONDITIONING

WELFARE BENEFITS UPON CITIZENSHIP OR

RESIDENCY HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In claimant's action to recover welfare benefits, the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment prevents a state from conditioning welfare
benefits either upon the beneficiary's possession of United States
citizenship or, if the beneficiary is an alien, upon his having resided in
the United States for a specified number of years. The Court noted
that state statutes distinguishing citizens from non-citizens have been
upheld on the basis of a state's special interest in favoring its own
citizens over aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits and in
maintaining its financial integrity. Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33

(1915). Following the precedent of Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the Court concluded that the state's
interest in the instant case did not justify limiting welfare eligibility.
Consequently, the Court held that the state statutes violated the equal
protection clause and that the claimant was entitled to recover.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 363 (1971).

ALIEN

RECEIVING

LIMITED

EDUCATIONAL

CREDITS

DENIED

VISA

PREFERENCE AS A PROFESSIONAL

The Immigration and Naturalization Service denied appellant, an
alien immigrant, a visa preference classification as a professional.
Appellant had received 12 hours of undergraduate credit in accounting
in the Phillippines, as well as an additional 26 hours of accounting in
the United States from an unaccredited institution. In affirming the
denial of appellant's visa in the instant case, the court found that there
were sufficient facts upon which the Director could determine that
the appellant was not, and had not, been a member of the accounting
profession. Consequently, appellant was not entitled to a preference
visa under § 203(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1970). Reyes v. Carter, 441 F.2d 734 (9th Cir.
1971).

RETURN

FROM

BRIEF

TRIP

OUTSIDE

U.S.

NOT

AN

"ENTRY"

FOR

DEPORTATION PURPOSES

Following petitioner's conviction for forgery, the United States
sought deportation under § 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and
Vol. 5-No. 1
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Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4). Under that section, an alien
must have been convicted of a crime committed within five years after
entry into this country. Relying on Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449
(1963), the court held that return from a brief trip to Mexico did not
constitute entry for the purposes of § 241(a)(4). Yanez-Jaquez v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.
1971).

STATE

LIMITATION

FOR

CLAIMING

STATUTE

CONTROLLING

TIME

INHERITANCE BY

NON-RESIDENT

ALIENS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON

FEDERAL FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER,

Claimants, citizen-residents of the U.S.S.R., appeared and demanded their inheritance claim more than five years after date of
alleged intestate's death. The trial court found the claimants had not

proved sufficiently their relationship to the intestate. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded on grounds of judicial error. On
remand, claimants contended both that the California limitations
statute was tolled and that it was unconstitutional. The trial court
found for the claimants, but the California Court of Appeals reversed.
The court in the instant case affirmed, holding that where a state
statute provides that a non-resident alien must appear and demand his
interest in an estate within five years from the date of death, although
all other persons are allowed five years from the decree of distribution, such statute does not violate claimants' right to equal protection
and due process. Furthermore, the court held that the statute is not an
unconstitutional infringement on the federal government's exclusive
and plenary power to conduct foreign relations. In re Estate of
Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1971).

4. ANTITRUST

ACT OF

OF

ACTS
FENDANT

STATE

A

DOCTRINE

FOREIGN

BARS

ANTITRUST

SOVEREIGN

CLAIM ARISING

ALLEGEDLY

INDUCED

FROM

BY

DE-

A detailed comment on this case is found at page 251 supra.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92

(C.D. Calif. 1971).
Winter, 1971
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FOREIGN

CORPORATION

ELIGIBLE TO RECOVER

UNDER ROBINSON-

PATMAN ACT

The court allowed a Guatemalan corporation to recover the price of
coffee shipments, damages for breach of contract, and treble damages
for the defendant's violations of § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
El Salto S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1971).

5.
FIVE YEAR STATUTORY

SUBSEQUENT

CITIZENSHIP

RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT AS A CONDITION

TO RETENTION

OF CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS BORN

ABROAD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS

A detailed comment on this case is found at page 258 supra.
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).

6.

CRIMINAL LAW

SEIZURE OF MARIJUANA JUSTIFIED DURING SEARCH FOR ILLEGALLY
IMPORTED ALIENS

Defendants appealed from a conviction for unlawful transportation
of marijuana, alleging that the seizure of the contraband was
improper. The court held that an Immigration and Naturalization
officer was entitled to stop defendants' automobile three miles from
the Mexican-American border and search it in order to determine
whether the vehicle contained aliens unlawfully present in the United
States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, §
287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970). Since the marijuana was
discovered during the otherwise valid search for illegal aliens, the court
concluded that the officer was not obliged to disregard what he had
seen and that the resulting seizure of the contraband was proper.
United States v. Matin, 444 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1971).

SEARCH

SEVERAL

MILES

FROM

BORDER

JUSTIFIED

AS

BORDER

SEARCH

Defendant appealed from a conviction for smuggling marijuana into
the United States on the ground that there was no probable cause for
Vol. 5-No. 1
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the search. Appellant had crossed the Mexican-American border in an
automobile at high speed where there was no port of entry. He was
seen by a border patrol, chased and ultimately caught and searched
several miles inside the border. The court held that the ensuing search
was a border search and, therefore, that probable cause was not
necessary. United States v. Nunez-Martinez, 443 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1971).

SECOND

SEARCH

SIXTY

MIILES

FROM

BORDER

IMPOSES

NO

UNDUE

ELASTICITY ON "BORDER"

Defendants appealed from a conviction under the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act for conspiracy to receive, conceal and
facilitate transportation of heroin on the ground that the search of
their vehicle 60 miles from the Mexican border was an invalid border
search. The uncontroverted facts indicated that two of the four
co-defendants had crossed the Mexican-American border, where a
routine search was made of their automobile. Thereafter, they were
joined by two other co-defendants, and the group proceeded to Marfa,
Texas. Notwithstanding the fact that a routine search was made of
defendants' automobile at the border, the sheriff at Marfa, Texas, was
notified to stop and conduct a second search of the vehicle. The
subsequent search revealed nine grams of heroin. The court held that
the second search constituted a valid border search. It reasoned that
since there was only one available road between the border and the
place of the search, the second search imposed no "unreasonable
elasticity" on the border. United States v. Reagor, 441 F.2d 252 (5th
Cir. 1971).

RECAPTURE OF GOODS STOLEN FROM CUSTOMS CUSTODY NOT BORDER SEARCH

A harbor policeman stopped defendant as he was leaving a wharf
that had been the scene of waterfront thefts. Acting upon information
received from an informant, customs agents searched the trunk of
defendant's automobile and found a number of stolen radios.
Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 549 (1970), for
removing goods from customs custody. The court, however, granted
defendant's motion to supress evidence of the stolen radios because

the customs agents refused to reveal the identity or establish the
credibility of the informant. The court reasoned there was no
Winter, 1971

CASE DIGEST

probable cause for the search and, therefore, that the confiscated
items were the "poisonous fruit" of an illegal arrest. Additionally, the
court found that the subsequent seizure of the radios could not be
justified as a border search since defendant had crossed no border.
Furthermore, the court held that the fact that the alleged theft was
from customs custody was insufficient to distinguish it from ordinary
theft. United States v. Davis, 328 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. La. 1971).

7.
MEXICAN

CONCUBINAGE

FAMILY LAW
GIVES

RISE

TO

TEXAS

COMMON

LAW

MARRIAGE

In a workman's compensation action, the alleged common law wife
of the deceased appealed from a summary judgment awarding death
benefits to the mother of the deceased. Plaintiff offered evidence of a
"concubinage" relationship recognized by Mexican law under which
she and deceased lived together as husband and wife. Although the
relationship could be terminated by either party without the other's
consent and without legal action, the court held that such a
relationship could become a common law marriage if the couple
subsequently moved to Texas and agreed to such marriage. The court
concluded that plaintiff's allegation that such an agreement was made
in Texas raised an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor

of the deceased's mother. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 466 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971).
WIFE DOES NOT ACQUIRE HUSBAND'S BRITISH DOMICILE WHEN BOTH
SPEND MAJORITY OF TIME ELSEWHERE

A British subject appealed from a Florida state court determination
that his wife retained her Florida domicile after their marriage, where
the wife stayed only briefly in England and the husband never
provided a marital home there. On appeal, the instant court
acknowledged the common law rule that a wife acquires the husband's
domicile upon marriage. Nevertheless, it held that although the rule
created a presumption, the trial court was justified in deciding that the
wife had retained her Florida domicile because she continued to
maintain her Florida home and spent more time with her husband in
Florida than in England. Ashmore v. Ashmore, 251 So. 2d 15 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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8. FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS
POWER OF ATTORNEY IS INSUFFICIENT INTEREST TO PREVENT BLOCKAGE OF ASSETS UNDER FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS

Pursuant to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, appellant, a
Hong Kong resident, sought to avoid blockage in New York of assets
of his father's estate that belonged to heirs residing in Shanghai.
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.101 (1971)-the
regulations issued by the Secretary of Treasury pursuant to § 5 of the
Trading With the Enemy Act and Executive Order 9193-prohibit
transactions involving property of designated foreign nationals unless
licensed by the Secretary. Appellant argued that the Secretary of
Treasury should issue a transfer license, or alternatively, that the
transfer of the estate assets to appellant was exempt from the licensing
requirement. Since he had received a power of attorney in 1950 over
the New York assets prior to the "freezing date," appellant contended
that he held an interest in the property as an "unblocked national" by
virtue of his Hong Kong residency and that a subsequent transfer of
the heirs' interest to him was exempt from the licensing requirement.
The New York Surrogate's Court ruled that the 1950 power of
attorney vested in the appellant the beneficial use of the entire New
York estate. The district court, however, held that the power of
attorney did not transfer the Shanghai heirs' interest to appellant. The
instant court affirmed, and held that since there was no transfer of
interest to appellant, the assets of the Shanghai heirs were subject to
the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. Furthermore, the court held

that § 500.523 of the regulations, which limits transactions to the
administration of the estate, could not be used to insulate the
surrogate court's decision from subsequent examination by federal
courts. Moreover, the Secretary's policy of denying requests for
release of blocked assets was reasonable and consistent with the policy
behind the Act. That policy, according to the court, was not only to
prevent the flow of hard currency to blocked countries and their
nationals, but also to preserve those assets in order to settle American
claims against those governments and their citizens. Cheng Yih-Chun
v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 442 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1971).
9. IMPORT-EXPORT
OBSCENE MATERIAL IMPORTED FOR PRIVATE USE SUBJECT TO LAWFUL SEIZURE

Customs agents, pursuant to the Tariff Act § 305, 19 U.S.C. §
1305 (1970), formerly ch. 497, § 305, 46 Stat. 688 (1930), which
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prohibits the importation of obscene material, seized allegedly
obscene photographs from defendant as he was entering the United
States. The United States District Attorney subsequently brought a
forfeiture proceeding in federal district court. Defendant denied that
the photographs were obscene, counterclaimed and alleged that
§ 1305(a) was unconstitutional. A three-judge court held §
1305(a) unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to meet the
procedural requirements of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965). Furthermore, the court, relying on Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), held that the section was overly broad since it
contained a prohibition against the possession of obscene material for
private use. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Noting that
forfeiture proceedings were initiated within thirteen days of the
seizure, the Court held that the statutory requirements and the
constitutional standard set by Freedman were met. Additionally, the
Court distinguished Stanley by holding that the immunity of a private
user in his home does not extend to allow him to import obscene
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,402
material from abroad.
3
U.S. 363 (1971).

10. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
FOREIGN MARKETS CLOSED TO CORPORATION INFRINGING PATENT

Plaintiff brought a patent infringement action under 35 U.S.C. §
271 (A) (1970) against defendant corporation for the unauthorized
marketing abroad of a shrimp de-veining machine. In a companion
case, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiff's patents were valid and that
they had been infringed by defendant. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth
Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971). The court in the instant
case held that if all essential parts were produced in the United States,
defendant could not sell its machine in foreign markets even though

the minor step of final assembly in the foreign country was
contemplated. The court rejected the reasoning of other circuit courts
which have held that since the patent is on the finished product, and
not on the parts, the patent laws are not violated until the machine is
complete. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th
Cir. 1966); Gold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry
Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1956); Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea,
79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935). Rather, the instant court reasoned that
3. See Commentary, 23 ALA. L.
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the word "makes" under § 271 of the statute should not be given an
artificial or technical construction, but should mean the substantial
manufacture of the component parts of the machine. This interpretation, according to the court, respects the purpose of the rule adopted
by the other circuits in that it does not diminish the public right to
use elements of the patented machine. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth
Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971).

11. INSURANCE
CUBAN

MONETARY

LAW

CONTROLS INSURANCE

POLICIES TO DENY

BENEFITS TO U.S. CITIZENS

Plaintiffs, beneficiaries under two life insurance policies, and the
insured were American citizens residing in Cuba when the insurance
policies were issued. Shortly after Castro assumed power, they fled
Cuba and returned to the United States. The insured died in New
York in 1961 and the plaintiffs demanded that the policy proceeds be
paid in New York in United States currency. The defendant insurance
company refused to pay in dollars, but declared that it would pay in
pesos in Cuba on the grounds that Cuban law governed the policies
and required that they be payable only in pesos. The federal district
court held that Cuban law governed the performance of these policies
and that defendant was required to discharge its obligation only in
pesos. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, and reasoned that New
York public policy was not offended by giving extraterritorial effect
to Cuban law since that was the place where the policies were issued.
Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971).

12. JURISDICTION
FEDERAL

COURT

HAS

JURISDICTION

OVER

OWNERS

OF

FOREIGN

REALTY WHERE U.S. CONTACTS SUFFICIENT

Appellant, a real estate broker, contracted in Florida for the sale of
realty located in the Bahama Islands with six of its seven co-owners.
All of these six co-owners were residents of Florida. The seventh
co-owner, a resident of the Bahamas, refused to sign. Appellee, who
had succeeded to the interest in the property of one of the Florida
co-owners, brought the present action in an attempt to invalidate the
contract. In granting summary judgment for appellee, the Florida
district court declared the contract invalid as a matter of law since it
had not been signed by one of the co-owners. On appeal, appellant
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challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court, averring that it lacked
jurisdiction because the property was located in a foreign country.
This court affirmed and held that the district court had jurisdiction
over the six co-owners of the foreign property who signed the contract
since they were all residents of the United States and had all
personally appeared before the court. Additionally, it reasoned that
the contract had been signed in Florida. Furthermore, it stated that
appellant had used her position as a licensed real estate broker in
Florida to formulate the agreement and, therefore, owed fiduciary
obligations to the Floridians by virtue of her license. Consequently,
the court held that there were sufficient Florida contacts to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the district court. Bethell v. Peace, 441
F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).

JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURT PROPER WHERE IT PROVIDES SOLE
PROTECTION FOR U.S. CITIZEN

Following a conviction by a military court for assault with intent to
commit rape, appellant, a U.S. serviceman stationed in Germany, filed
a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Appellant, relying on
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), asserted that the military
court was without jurisdiction to try him for a non-military offense
committed off-post while on leave. The district court distinguished
O'Callahan on the ground that O'Callahan's crime was committed in a
jurisdiction operating under the Constitution and law of the United

States, but that appellant committed his crime in a jurisdiction that
was beyond the reach of a United States civil court. Since the only
constitutional protection available in the present case was offered by a
military court, the court reasoned that its jurisdiction properly was
invoked. Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1971).

PRESENCE

OF

PRODUCT

WITHIN

STATE

SUFFICIENT

TO

CONFER

JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN MANUFACTURER

Plaintiff's action was brought in a Louisiana state court against a
Swedish manufacturer for the death of a workman resulting from
defects in the crane on which he was working. The defendant-manufacturer did not sell cranes, conduct other business or maintain
offices or agents in the United States. Defendant's cranes entered this
country through an independent intermediary that had the exclusive
right to buy them for export to the United States. Although the
defendant corporation alleged that it had no knowledge of what
Vol. 5-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

happened to the cranes after the sale to the intermediary in Sweden,
the instant court nevertheless found jurisdiction under the Louisiana
long-arm statute. The court reasoned that the presence of a substantial
number of cranes located within the state was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer. Boykin v. Lindenkranar,
252 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App. 1971).

13. REFUGEE PROTOCOL
U.N.

REFUGEE PROTOCOL APPLICABLE TO PANAMA CANAL ZONE

In a habeas corpus proceeding to test the propriety of petitioner's
extradition to Panama, the Canal Zone District Court denied relief and
refused to consider the applicability of the 1967 U.N. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 15, 1968, [1967] 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, since Panama was not a party. While the
instant action was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, three unrelated cases
arose subsequent to the district court's decision wherein the State
Department informed the Republic of Panama that the United States
intended to hold Panama to the terms of the U.N. Protocol. In effect,
the position taken by the United States would deny extradition to
Panama when it could be demonstrated that a fugitive's life or
freedom would be threatened because of his political views. The
opinion of the circuit court emphasized the political overtones of
Panama's allegation that petitioner obtained improper mortgage
financing through his position as a minister in the government that the
provisional government of the demanding state had replaced. Because
of the prior statements of the State Department and the assertion in
the United States Government's brief that the Refugee Protocol was
applicable to the Canal Zone, the court of appeals remanded the
proceedings for further findings regarding the petitioner's status as a
political refugee. Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971).

14. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
EXECUTIVE

SUGGESTION

BINDING

ON

COURTS

DESPITE

CON-

TRACTUAL WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

A detailed comment on this case is found at page 264, supra.
Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1971).

